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Note
EFFECTS OF CORROBORATION INSTRUCTIONS
IN A RAPE CASE ON EXPERIMENTAL JURIES
By VALERIE P. HANs* and NEIL BROOKSt
A. INTRODUCTION
The rules of evidence have evolved, in the main, to protect the jury from
being misled, prejudiced or confused by certain types of evidence which might
be presented to it. The rules attempt to achieve this purpose by utilizing a
number of techniques, which were fashioned by common law judges. First,
evidence which gives rise to these dangers might be excluded from the jury's
consideration altogether.1 Secondly, such evidence might have to be corro-
borated by other evidence before the jury is permitted to reach a verdict in
the case.2 Thirdly, the judge might be compelled to instruct the jury that it is
dangerous to reach a verdict solely on the basis of this type of evidence. It
is this third technique of increasing the probability of a correct jury verdict
that was the subject of the experiment described in this paper.
In most common law jurisdictions, the judge must caution the jury that
it is dangerous to convict in the absence of corroboration, on the testimony
@ Copyright, 1978, Valerie P. Hans and Nell Brooks.
* Valerie Hans is a lecturer in psychology at Scarborough College, University of
Toronto.
t Neil Brooks is an associate professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
The authors are indebted to Tony Doob for his helpful comments throughout all
phases of the research reported here. We would like to thank Michal Stopnicki for her
work coding the jury deliberations and Dennis Domoney for his assistance with the data
analysis. Finally, we would like to express our appreciation to the staff of the Ontario
Science Centre, who allowed us to conduct this research on their premises.
1 See generally, R. Cross, Evidence (4th ed. London: Butterworths, 1974); C.
McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, ed. E. Cleary (2d ed. St. Paul: West
Pub. Co., 1972); and Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1940).
2See generally, A. Branca, "Corroboration," in R. Salhany and R. Carter, eds.,
Studies in Canadian Criminal Evidence (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) at 133-218; A.
Mahoney, "Corroboration Revisited," in Canadian Bar Association, Studies in Criminal
Law and Procedure (Agincourt: Canada Law Book Ltd., 1973) at 133-84; C. Savage,
Corroboration (1963-64), 6 Crim. L.Q. 159; and C. Savage, Corroboration in Sexual
Offences (1963-64), 6 Crim. L.Q. 282.
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of an accomplice," a child,4 or a victim of a sexual offenceY The actual in-
struction the judge gives the jury, when the testimony of one of these cate-
gories of witnesses is given in a trial, can be conveniently divided into two
parts: first, the judge must warn the jury that it is dangerous to convict on
the testimony of the witness alone; second, he or she must list for the jury
the independent evidence in the case that the jurors might find corroborates
the testimony of the witness.
We sought to test the efficacy of this method of jury control by designing
an experiment around a hypothetical rape case. In many jurisdictions this
instruction is no longer required in rape cases. 6 The results of the study not
only support the wisdom of this legislative change, but also shed light on the
efficacy of the instruction as it applies to accomplices and children. Thus,
while the remainder of this paper refers to rape cases, the analysis also applies
to cases in which these other categories of witnesses give testimony.
The requirement for corroboration instructions in rape cases rests upon
three empirical assumptions. The first assumption is that the testimony of a
victim in a rape case is likely to be unreliable. There are many motivations,
it is alleged, which drive women to make false accusations of rape. This parti-
cular assumption has been the subject of much debate.
7
3 See Davies v. D.P.P., [1954] A.C. 378; 2 W.L.R. 343; 1 All E.R. 507 (H.L.);
Gouin v. The King, [1926] S.C.R. 539, 46 C.C.C. 1, 3 D.L.R. 649, reversing 41 Que.
K.B. 157, 424. See generally J. Heydon, The Corroboration of Accomplices, [1973]
Crim. L. Rev. 264; Annotation, Propriety of Specific Jury Instructions as to Credibility
of Accomplices, 4 ALR3d 351; and E. Harnon, The Need for Corroboration of Accom-
plice Testimony and the Need for "Something Additional" to the Testimony of Someone
"Involved" (1971), 6 Is. L. Rev. 81.
4 In Canada, the testimony of an unsworn child must be corroborated: Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 586. A warning must be given for children who testify
under oath. Kendall v. The Queen, [1962] S.C.R. 469; 132 C.C.C. 216; Horsburgh v.
The Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 746; [1968] 2 C.C.C. 288; 63 D.L.R.(2d) 699, reversing
[1966] 1 O.R. 739; 3 C.C.C. 240; 55 D.L.R.(2d) 289. See generally G. Williams,
Corroboration-Sexual Cases, [1962] Crim. L. Rev. 662; and I. Andrews, The Evidence
of Children, [1964] Crim. L. Rev. 769.
5 In Canada, the testimony of the victims of some sexual offences must be corrobo-
rated. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 139(1). Formerly the jury had to be
warned that it was not safe to rely upon the uncorroborated evidence of rape victims.
In 1976 this requirement, imposed by the Criminal Code, was repealed. Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 142 rep. by S.C., 1974-75-76, c. 93, s. 8.
6 Id.
7 Guilt about involvement in sexual intercourse, revenge against a boyfriend or
lover, and rape fantasies are offered as possible reasons for women making false rape
charges. Helene Deutsch appears to be responsible for the notion that some women who
want to be raped may fantasize about being raped and may confuse consensual inter-
course for rape. This contention has engendered quite a lot of debate. See H. Deutsch,
The Psychology of Women, A Psychoanalytic Interpretation (New York: Grune and
Stratton, 1944) for her position on female masochism, rape, and rape fantasies. Also
see Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform (1972), 81 Yale
L. J. at 1376-78; and S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1975) at 350-62 for discussion of Deutsch's ideas. For a
full discussion of the basis for rules of evidence in rape cases, see N. Brooks, Rape and
the Laws of Evidence (1975), 23 Chitty's L. J. 1.
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The second premise upon which the corroboration instruction rests is
that the jury is likely to be misled by the testimony of the victim in a rape
case. Being unfamiliar with the supposed reasons, psychological and other,
for which a woman may make a false accusation of rape, the jury will be
unable to rationally evaluate the reliability of her testimony.
Finally, it is assumed that an instruction which warns of the danger of
convicting on the basis of the testimony of the victim alone, and which sets
out the evidence in the case which might constitute corroboration of her
testimony, will lessen this danger and cause juries to evaluate the evidence
more rationally.
An experiment was conducted to test the accuracy of this third assumption
about the effects of corroboration instructions on the jury. By giving different
groups of experimental juries different instructions about the issue of corrobo-
ration, we attempted to determine whether corroboration instructions affected
simulated juries, and, if so, in what manner.
Of utmost interest is the effect of varying corroboration instructions on
the verdicts rendered by juries. The only empirical study that has varied the
presence of corroboration instructions and observed its effect on verdicts was
a jury simulation done by the Jury Project of the London School of Econo-
mics.8 Unfortunately, methodological problems with the data analysis prevent
us from considering the results of this experiment as accurate.0 However, their
discussion of the effect of corroboration instructions, in light of their experi-
mental findings, is quite intriguing:
Our expectation was that there would be fewer conviction [sic] when the cor-
roboration warning (was) given... than when it was not.... The actual results
tend to the contrary.... [rihe willingness of jurors to convict him (the defend-
ant) of the more serious charge--rape-was markedly greater when the corrobo-
ration warning had been given. A possible explanation lies in the fact that, the
judge, after giving the warning, must then state whether particular pieces of evi-
dence may amount to corroboration, and in so doing causes the jurors to favour
convicting. . . . The suggestion of our figures is that . . . the corroboration
warning may be positively detrimental to the accused.' 0
Corroboration instructions are intended to protect the accused and it is as-
sumed that they do so. Thus, their suggestion that one element of these in-
structions, the listing of evidence corroborating the victim's testimony, is
positively detrimental to the accused, is provocative.
To ascertain whether this finding is correct and, if so, which part of
the instructions may have this effect, the present experiment varied indepen-
dently the two parts of the judge's corroboration instructions: the warning
8 L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, [1973] Crim. L. Rev. 208.
0 In a test of significance, it is necessary to have independent observations or to
control for factors which may affect the dependent measures. The L.S.E. jury study
allowed individual jurors to deliberate together and took post-discussion individual deci-
sions as their unit of analysis. The group discussion may well have affected the subse-
quent verdicts by individuals, probably making them more homogeneous. The point is
that their data are not analyzed correctly, and therefore, are uninterpretable.
10 Supra, note 8 at 220.
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about the unreliability of the victim's testimony, and the listing of evidence
which may constitute corroboration of her testimony. This design permitted
us to look at the effects of each part of the judge's corroboration instructions
on jury verdicts.
If corroboration instructions do have an effect on juries, it is important
to know what that effect is. There appear to be certain assumptions about the
way in which corroboration instructions should affect jury deliberations. First,
since the judge must warn the jury about the victim's testimony, the assump-
tion must be that this will lead jurors to scrutinize the victim's testimony more
carefully than they otherwise would. Second, since the judge must list the
potentially corroborative evidence and direct the jury to consider whether in
fact the evidence does corroborate the victim's testimony, the assumption
must be that this will cause the jury to more carefully assess the probative
value of this evidence. Both of these assumptions may be tested empirically
by making comparisons between discussions by juries who are or are not
given corroboration instructions in a particular case.
Corroboration instructions could affect jury discussions in other ways. A
jury given the instructions may engage in a qualitatively different type of deli-
beration from a jury not given such instructions. One possibility is that the
judge's emphasis on corroborative evidence may lead the jury to discuss the
facts of the case more carefully instead of relying on emotional reactions to
the defendant and to the victim to decide the case. Psychological research
indicates that a negative attribute of a person, such as a victim's bad or
questioned credibility, can give rise to a generalization as to other aspects of
the person such as their character.:" Thus, another potential effect of corro-
boration instructions is that jurors may view the victim's character as bad
and may discuss her more negatively when the judge warns them about her
credibility.
To explore these questions about the effects of corroboration instruc-
tions on jury deliberations, the simulated jury deliberations in the present
study were tape recorded and analyzed for content. This permitted an assess-
ment of whether corroboration instructions had the effect on jury delibera-
tions which the law assumes them to have. One would expect that jurors
would discuss the corroborative evidence more in those experimental condi-
tions in which the judge lists it, and that jurors would discuss the victim's
credibility more in those conditions in which the judge warns them of the
unreliability of her testimony.
B. METHOD
1. Experimental Design
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ing about the victim's credibility and the listing of potentially corroborative
evidence) were varied independently in a 2 X 2 experimental design. Thus,
there were four conditions in the experiment. In one condition, no corrobora-
tion instructions at all were given (the No Warning, No Test condition). In
a second condition, a warning was given and the corroborative evidence was
listed (the Warning, List condition). In the two remaining conditions, each
part of the corroboration instructions was presented alone. In the third condi-
tion, subjects were given only a warning (Warning, No List condition); and
in the fourth condition, subjects were given only a listing of the potentially
corroborative evidence (No Warning, List condition). Both group and indi-
vidual decisions about the defendant's guilt were obtained.
2. Subjects
The 368 subjects (184 men and 184 women) in the experiment were
visitors to the Ontario Science Centre who volunteered for participation in
the experiment. Subjects were at least eighteen years of age. Responses to
questions about age and occupation, which were asked of a substantial pro-
portion of these subjects, indicated that the subjects were a heterogeneous
group with respect to these two variables. Eighty men and eighty women
participated in the group decision-making part of the experiment. In many
instances, participants within a group knew one another. The rest of the
subjects (104 men and 104 women) participated in the individual decision
portion of the experiment.
3. Materials
Depending on the experimental condition, subjects listened to one of
four tape recordings. The first part of each tape recording was the same; it
consisted of the judge's summary of the evidence in the case. To briefly
summarize the facts the subjects heard: the case involved a young woman,
Catherine McNeilly, who accepted a ride from a stranger, the defendant,
James Miller. She testified that after she got into the car with the defendant,
he drove her out to a deserted area and raped her. She testified that he
threatened her, saying that if she did not do what he said, he would hurt her
badly. After intercourse occurred, he drove her to her apartment and dropped
her off. She then went with her roommate to the doctor and to the police to
report the rape. The defendant testified that he had picked the young woman
up, that they had kissed at red lights, that one thing had led to another, and
that they had had sexual intercourse. He stated that at no time did he threaten
her.'
2
The second part of the tape recording consisted of the experimental
manipulation of the judge's corroboration instructions. In all conditions, the
judge first instructed the jury about the legal definition of rape, taken from
section 143 of the Criminal Code:
The defendant, James Miller, has been accused of raping Catherine MeNeilly. Let
me read you the section of the Criminal Code that is applicable in this case: "A
12 The facts of the case and the judge's instructions were taken from an actual case
heard in Ontario. However, the facts of the case were altered to fit the needs of the
experiment.
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male person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse with a female person
who is not his wife, without her consent, or with her consent if the consent is
extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm." Now in the case before us, the issue
is the woman's consent. The prosecution's theory is that Miss MeNeilly did not
consent to sexual intercourse with the defendant, and the theory of the defence
is that she did consent.
Then, depending on the experimental condition, the judge (a) concluded the
instructions (No Warning, No List condition); (1) gave the jury both a warn-
ing about the victim's reliability and a listing of the potentially corroborative
evidence (Warning, List condition); (c) gave the jury a warning about the
reliability of the victim's testimony (Warning, No List condition); or (d)
gave the jury a listing of the evidence in the case which could corroborate the
victim's testimony (No Warning, List condition). The warning that the judge
gave was as follows:
Another section of the Criminal Code is concerned particularly with the testimony
of rape victims. By this section I am directed to warn you that it is very dan-
gerous to convict the accused, Mr. Miller, of rape, on the basis of Miss McNeilly's
testimony alone. You should look for corroborative evidence-other independent
evidence which shows the accused is guilty of rape. The reason for this section is
obvious. A woman can very easily say that a man she had intercourse with
committed rape and it is difficult for a man to defend himself. It is therefore ex-
ceedingly dangerous to convict the defendant solely on the basis of Miss McNeilly's
testimony, but you are entitled to do so if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that her evidence is true.
The judge's listing of potentially corroborative evidence was as follows:
In deciding the case, you should look for corroborative evidence. Corroborative
evidence is independent evidence in the case which tends to confirm the com-
plainant's story and to disconfirm the defendant's story. You as jurors must decide
whether evidence is corroborative of the complainant's story. The following pieces
of evidence in this case might be considered to be corroborative of Miss McNeilly's
testimony: first, the condition of her pants. Although they were relatively new,
they were torn and the zipper was broken. The doctor's report that she had
recently bruised her knee and that she seemed upset at the time of his examina-
tion might also be viewed as consistent with Miss MeNeilly's testimony. It is up
to you to decide whether or not these pieces of evidence that I have listed do
constitute corroboration of her testimony.
These instructions about corroboration conformed closely to the trial judge's
instructions given in a rape case heard in Ontario.
In all conditions, the judge concluded the instructions by telling the jury
that it was now up to them to decide whether the defendant was guilty or not
guilty of rape as charged.
4. Procedure
(a) Group Decisions
There were forty groups of four persons in the experiment, although
one group was not included in the analysis due to an error in experimental
procedure, leaving thirty-nine groups for the analysis. Each group, consisting
of two women and two men, was seated around a table in a private room at
the Ontario Science Centre. They were told by the experimenter that they
were going to discuss a criminal case of rape and reach a group verdict about
the defendant's guilt. The group members were told at this point that if they
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objected to discussing the case of rape, they were free to leave, although no
one did. The experimenter told them that they would be listening to a tape
recording of a judge who would summarize the evidence in the rape case and
who would instruct them in the laws regarding rape which should guide the
jury in coming to their decision. The experimenter then played one of the four
tape recordings to the subjects. After playing the tape recording, the experi-
menter instructed the subjects to come to a group verdict concerning the
defendant's guilt or innocence. She then turned on a tape recorder to record
the group's discussion and left the room. All groups were instructed to come
to a unanimous guilty or not guilty verdict. Some groups, however, after a
period of deliberation, informed the experimenter that they could not reach
a unanimous verdict in the case. In these instances, "hung" jury verdicts were
allowed.13
After the completion of the decision-making process, each group was
fully debriefed and questions were answered by the experimenter. Subjects
were encouraged to give their names and addresses to the experimenter if
they wanted to know the results of the study, and, in fact, a majority of the
participants did so.
(b) Individual Decisions
The same experimental design was employed with individuals. Subjects
were asked to read a summary of the evidence presented in a case of rape
and answer a few questions about the case. Each was given a written version
of one of the four tape recordings of the judge's summary of the evidence and
his corroboration instructions, prefaced by the following:
Imagine that you are a juror, sitting in court on jury duty. Your task is to reach
a decision about a defendant's guilt in a rape case. First, you will hear a summary
of the evidence presented in the courtroom by the complainant, the defendant,
and other witnesses. Then, the trial judge will instruct you on the laws regarding
rape which should guide you in coming to your verdict in the case.
Each individual subject was asked to reach a verdict in the case. Of course,
subjects participating in the group verdict condition were not allowed to par-
ticipate in the individual verdict condition, nor were individual verdict condi-
tion subjects later allowed to participate in the group verdict condition.
5. Data Analysis for the Jury Deliberations
The recorded group deliberations were analyzed by first breaking down
each discussion into codes representing different types of statements. Ap-
proximately forty-seven different classes of statements were coded in this
manner. For example, statements about the victim, the defendant, the corro-
borative evidence, and mention of other specific pieces of evidence were all
assigned different codes. In addition to being coded for content, each state-
ment was assigned a valence. Each statement was classified as (a) a neutral
comment, (b) a comment damaging to the defendant's case and consistent
with his conviction, or (c) a comment favourable to the defendant's case and
13 The number of hung juries did not differ significantly across experimental
conditions.
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consistent with his acquittal.' 4 After each deliberation had been coded, the
frequencies of each type of statement were tabulated for each group. To test
whether or not corroboration instructions resulted in significant differences
in types of statements made by jurors, analyses of variance were performed
on the frequencies of particular statements or codes for the different corro-
boration instructions conditions.
C. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
1. Verdicts
The results of the group verdicts are presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Percentage of guilty verdicts for groups in each of the four
corroboration instructions conditions








The condition in which no form of corroboration instructions was given had
a somewhat higher percentage of guilty verdicts than the three conditions in
which some form of corroboration instructions was given to the subjects.
Thus, juries who heard some form of corroboration instructions tended to
convict less often than did those juries who did not hear any corroboration
instructions. This effect, however, fell short of statistical significance since the
observed difference had a p-value of only .081.15
14 A reliability check is an estimate of how reliable or repeatable the data analysis
is, and it is typically taken when the coding and analysis involve subjective judgments
on the part of the coder. The check attempts to assess whether or not any systematic
biases of the person coding the data contribute to the results, and therefore, whether
the conclusions based on the results are justified or invalid.
The reliability measure for the coding of the tape recorded deliberations was cal-
culated in the following manner: a second person, in addition to the regular person
coding the tapes, coded an arbitrarily selected discussion. The two coders agreed on 80%
of the codes for that group discussion. This level of agreement between coders is an
acceptable one. Thus, it seems unlikely that errors in coding in the present experiment
systematically biased the results.
15 Statistical tests provide estimates of the probability that observed differences
between experimental conditions occurred by chance. A statistically significant result of
p < .05 indicates that an apparent difference between experimental conditions is likely
to be due to chance alone fewer than 1 in 20 times. A statistically significant difference
between conditions which has a p-value of less than .01 specifies that the observed
difference between conditions occurred by chance is less than 1 in 100. In the group
verdict analysis, the p-value is .08 1. Thus, the 8 out of 100 times the observed differences
between conditions could have occurred by chance. A p-value of .05 is customarily
selected by researchers as the cut-off level for statistical significance.
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Subjects who rendered individual verdicts were not affected by corrobo-
ration instructions. There were no differences in percentages of guilty verdicts
for the four corroboration instructions conditions. However, women were
significantly more likely to convict the defendant than men. When giving in-
dividual verdicts, women convicted 61.25 per cent of the time, while 47.5 per
cent of the men in the study convicted the defendant (p>.05).
The prediction that there would be fewer guilty verdicts when groups
were given corroboration instructions was not strongly substantiated, although
there does appear to be a small effect of corroboration instructions on group
verdicts. It is interesting to note the lack of similarity between individual and
group verdicts as a function of corroboration instructions. A previous study16
on the effect of a criminal record on individual and group judgments of guilt
also failed to reveal consistent similarities between the effect of the record
on groups and on individuals. These results suggest that, if one is interested in
knowing the effects of certain instructions on juries, it may be critical to con-
duct group simulations rather than individual juror simulations.
2. Content of the lury Deliberations
(a) Discussion of Corroborative Evidence
One of the major purposes of analyzing the group discussions was to
determine how jurors dealt with corroborative evidence. When corroboration
instructions are given, the judge is, in effect, directing the jury to consider
whether certain pieces of evidence are corroborative of the victim's testimony.
We predicted that, in cases where the judge mentioned the need for corrobora-
tion and listed the corroborative evidence, this evidence would be discussed
more frequently. The frequency of discussion of the corroborative evidence,
then, was expected to be higher in the two List conditions than in the two No
List conditions.
This prediction, however, was not confirmed. A statistical analysis of
the frequency of statements about those pieces of evidence which the judge
listed as potentially corroborative yielded no significant results. As well, a
subsequent analysis of the percentage of statements about the corroborative
evidence in each of the four conditions indicated no differences as a function
of corroboration instructions. The fact that the judge in the List conditions
directed the jury to consider whether certain pieces of evidence were corro-
borative of the victim's testimony did not increase the jury's discussion of
that evidence. Apparently, the instruction does not cause the jury to discuss
and evaluate the corroborative evidence in greater detail than they otherwise
would.
(b) Discussion of Corroboration
We thought that the issue of corroboration (the need for it, whether the
victim's testimony was corroborated or not, and similar comments) would be
discussed more when the judge mentioned it. The number of times the jurors
16 V. Hans and A. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Delibera-
tions of Simulated Juries (1975-76), 18 Crim. L. Q. 235.
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TABLE 2
Frequency of statements about corroboration in each of the
four corroboration instructions conditions








mentioned the topic of corroboration in their deliberations was affected by
the judge's instructions. The mean frequencies of statements about corrobora-
tion in the four instructions conditions are shown in Table 2. There is a signi-
ficant interaction between the two judge's instructions variables, Warning and
List (p< .01). In the three conditions in which some form of corroboration
instructions was given, the mean frequencies of discussion of corroboration
are higher than in the condition in which no instructions were given (No Warn-
ing, No List condition). Oddly enough, discussion of corroboration is most
frequent when either the Warning or List is given alone. There is no signi-
ficant difference between the condition with no instructions (No Warning,
No List) and the condition with corroboration instructions as they are em-
ployed in the courts (Warning, List).
It is interesting to note the low incidence of mention of the topic of
corroboration. In the three conditions in which some form of corroboration
instructions was given, an average of 1.86 comments about corroboration
were made per group. In addition, there were only about fifteen instances
(out of some 3500 statements) in the two List conditions in which the topic
of corroboration and one of the pieces of evidence the judge mentioned as
potentially corroborative were mentioned together.1 7 The discussion of corro-
boration, and whether the evidence is corroborative of the victim's testimony,
does not appear to be critical to the group decision-making process. Given
the low incidence of discussion of corroboration and the previously men-
tioned lack of difference between List and No List juries in their discussion of
corroborative evidence, it seems unlikely the judge's instructions with respect
to corroboration are having their intended effect.
17 Examples of such instances are the following comments made by the subjects
in the study: "Torn clothes could be a sign of passion or corroboration of a violent
act." 'They [the pieces of corroborative evidence] tend to add weight to her argument."
"Neither the torn pants or the bruised knee supports her story sufficiently." These kinds
of comments about corroboration comprised about a quarter of all the comments made
about corroboration in the study. The other comments were typically more general,
such as the following comments taken from the deliberations: "If he drove her out to
the country what kind of corroborative evidence can you get?". "But I remember what
the judge said, he said you ... really shouldn't consider what she says too much. You
should look for corroborating evidence."
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(c) Discussion of the Victim
Another major concern was the effect of corroboration instructions on
discussion of the victim. As previously mentioned, with corroboration in-
structions, the victim's credibility is singled out for mandatory comment by
the judge. The judge highlights the possibility of false rape charges and warns
the jury to look closely at the victim's credibility. One would expect that the
victim's credibility would be discussed and questioned more frequently when
the judge warned the jury about the victim's credibility in the two Warning
conditions. In fact, there was no significant effect of the judge's warning on
discussion of the victim's credibility. There was, however, a significant effect
on the discussion of her credibility in the List instruction. When the judge
gives the List instruction, there is less mention of the victim's credibility.
The average frequency of comment about the victim's credibility was 7.79 in
the No List conditions and 5.05 in the List conditions (p< .05). It is possible
that the subjects felt that the judge had "taken care of" the problem of the
victim's credibility by listing pieces of evidence supporting her credibility.
They may have assumed that each juror had considered it, and they saw no
need to discuss it. It is difficult to evaluate this explanation from the findings,
however.
Another prediction concerning discussion of the victim, based on psych-
ological research,' 8 was that there would be a greater incidence of negative
discussion of the victim in the two Warning conditions than in the two No
Warning conditions. Discussion of the victim, both positive and negative dis-
cussion, appears to be governed, not only by the judge's warnings, but also
by the listing of the corroborative evidence. There were more statements
about the victim in the condition in which no instructions were given than in
the other three conditions in which coroboration instructions were given
(p <.01 for this interaction). This pattern of results is displayed in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Discussion about the victim in each of the four corroboration instructions
conditions. (Frequencies of statements about the victim are displayed;
proportions of the total discussion which are spent on discussion of the
victim are shown in parentheses.)




victim 47.2 (19%) 17.9 (14%)
Warning
about
victim 25.1 (16%) 26.5 (17%)
The same pattern of results prevailed for both positive and negative state-
ments about the victim.
18 Supra, note 11.
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Another way of examining the effect of corroboration instructions on
discussion of the victim is to look at the percentage of time spent in discus-
sion of the victim in each of the corroboration instructions conditions. Table
3 displays in parentheses the average percentages of time that juries spent
mentioning the victim as a function of corroboration instructions. The great-
est percentage of time spent discussing the victim occurred in the condition
in which no corroboration instructions were given. In this condition, 19 per
cent of the total discussion was spent talking about the victim, whereas in the
No Warning, List condition, only 14 per cent of the total deliberation was
spent talking about the victim. This is a statistically significant difference
(p< .05). Less time, both absolutely and relatively, was spent discussing the
victim when corroboration instructions were given. It appears that discussion
of the victim does vary as a function of corroboration instructions, although
not in the expected direction.
(d) Discussion of the Defendant
Another manner in which corroboration instructions may operate is by
influencing discussion of the defendant. If the judge makes negative com-
ments about the victim's credibility, jurors may view the defendant's credibi-
lity, and the defendant, in a more positive light.
While the expected differences in negative discussion about the victim
did not materialize, negative and positive discussion about the defendant did
change, depending on corroboration instructions. There were no significant
differences among the four experimental conditions in total discussion of the
defendant. Tables 4 and 5, however, demonstrate that positive and negative
comments about the defendant varied with instructions. Table 4 shows the
frequency of negative comments about the defendant for each of the four
conditions. The judge's warning had a significant effect. When subjects were
TABLE 4
Frequency of negative, unfavourable comments about the defendant in
each of the four corroboration instructions conditions








warned about the victim, there were fewer negative comments about the de-
fendant (p<.01). Table 5 displays the mean frequencies of positive com-
ments about the defendant. Here, the List variable had a significant effect.
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TABLE 5
Frequency of positive, favourable comments about the defendant in each of
the four corroboration instructions conditions








When the judge listed the evidence in the case which was potentially corro-
borative of the victim's testimony, there were significantly fewer positive com-
ments about the defendant (p<.05).
Group discussion of the defendant's credibility was also affected by the
listing of corroborative evidence. The defendant's credibility was discussed
less when the judge listed the evidence which could corroborate the victim's
testimony. An average of 6.02 statements about the defendant's credibility
were made per group in the two No List conditions, compared to an average
per group of 2.95 comments in the two List conditions (p.<.01). Analysis of
discussion of the defendant's credibility also yielded one of the few sex dif-
ferences in the study. Men were significantly more likely than women to
discuss the defendant's credibility. Men made an average of 2.87 comments
about the defendant's credibility, while women made an average of 1.61 state-
ments about his credibility (p<.05 ).
The results of the groups' discussion of the defendant are more in line
with our original expectations of how corroboration instructions should affect
group deliberations than the results of the groups' discussions of the victim.
When a warning about the victim was given, for example, it was expected
that negative comments about the victim should increase and negative con-
ments about the defendant should decrease. Likewise, when the judge listed
those things in the case which were consistent with the victim's testimony,
more positive comments about the victim and fewer positive comments about
the defendant might be expected. Effects on discussion of the victim were
contrary to predictions, but the manner in which discussion of the defendant
is altered by corroboration instructions is more congruent with expectations.
The relationship between discussion of the defendant and the victim and
corroboration instructions is apparently a complex one.
(e) Discussion of the Evidence
One important function of the jury is to determine the facts. Therefore,
it is important to know whether jurors spend more or less time discussing the
evidence when given different judge's instructions. Indeed, corroboration in-
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structions did affect the frequency of discussion of the evidence. When the
judge gave the List instruction, there were significantly fewer references to
the evidence. The average number of comments about the evidence in No
List groups was 48.59, while the average for the List groups was 32.4
(p<.05). Certainly the judge's admonition to attend to the corroborative
evidence does not produce a more "evidence-oriented" discussion.
(f) Sex Differences
There were surprisingly few sex differences in this experiment. Rape is a
crime that could easily have differential significance or importance for men
and women. Additionally, in discussing a rape case, men and women might
take different perspectives-the man more concerned about false rape
charges, for example, and the woman more concerned about restitution for
the victim. This sort of reasoning has been used to justify the prevalence of all
male or primarily male juries in rape cases. 19 It has been assumed that female
jurors would be unduly biased against the defendant and would not give him
a fair trial.
In this experiment, however, few apparent differences between men and
women emerged. In the individual verdict conditions, women were more
likely to convict the defendant than men.20 Jury verdicts are not made indivi-
dually, however, and in a group setting the experiment disclosed that men
and women behaved quite similarly in the types of comments they made
about the case. From the forty-seven different types of statements that were
examined in the group discussions, only three significant differences between
the sexes arose. Men were more likely to discuss the victim's bruise on her
knee and the defendant's credibility, while women were more likely to con-
sider the fact that the victim immediately reported the rape to the hospital
doctor and the police as favourable to the victim's case. There were no sex
differences with respect to other statements about the defendant, the victim,
or the evidence.
It is important to caution against accepting the sex differences in indi-
vidual verdicts as evidence for the statement that women sitting on a jury
will be more biased against the defendant. Their behaviour in the simulated
jury setting, rather than their individually rendered verdicts, would appear to
be a better predictor of their behaviour in a real jury.2
19 S. Brownmiller, supra, note 7.
20 Sex differences are not commonly found in experiments which examine judgments
in rape cases. In this context, it should be mentioned that the rape case in this experi-
ment was purposely designed as ambiguous. Such ambiguity may have maximized any
differences between the sexes.
21 Our study was not explicitly designed to test sex differences in a group setting.
Whether sex differences in judgments about rape cases within such a setting exist could
be determined by varying experimentally the proportion of women in simulated juries
(for example, 25, 50, and 75 per cent of the group members could be women) and
observing the effects on group verdicts and jury deliberations.
[VOL. 15, NO. 3
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This experiment was designed to test certain assumptions about the
manner in which corroboration instructions affect a jury's deliberation and
verdict in a rape case. In the study, there were fewer guilty verdicts in the three
judge's instructions conditions than in the conditions in which no corrobora-
tion instructions were given, although the difference was not great. Given
that the instructions had some effect on verdicts, we wanted to know whether
the assumptions made about the way in which corroboration instructions af-
fect juries were warranted. The assumptions appeared to be that a jury will
direct its discussion more towards corroborative evidence and question the
victim's credibility more when given corroboration instructions. Neither of
these predictions was confirmed. The jury does not appear to be affected
by the judge's corroboration instructions in the manner intended.
It appears that the jury discusses the victim for a greater proportion of
the time when no instructions are given, and positive and negative statements
about the defendant are affected in a complex way by the Warning and List
components of the judge's instructions. Rather than directly affecting the dis-
cussion of corroborative evidence, corroboration instructions may alter the
way in which the principals in a rape case are discussed. It is conceivable
that subjects are picking up a general impression from the judge's instructions
(for example, "the defendant is good") rather than the specific information
about treatment of corroborative evidence. Another possibility is that the
jurors do not exactly understand what they are to do when given corrobora-
tion instructions.
This study has certain implications for the legal system which regularly
employs corroboration instructions in cases involving accomplices and child
witnesses. One implication involves the importance of the judge's listing of
evidence which is potentially corroborative in court cases. In our study, the
judge's listing of the evidence had only a marginal effect on group verdicts.
A replication of our study in which the strength of the corroborative evidence
was increased also failed to show an effect for the List variable on simulated
jurors' verdicts.22 It is always difficult to generalize from negative findings, but
these two studies, taken together, suggest that it is not necessary that the
judge list those pieces of evidence in the case which are potentially corrobo-
rative. Yet countless appeals, in cases where corroboration instructions are
required, have been based on the assumption that a judge's correct listing of
corroborative evidence in a case is critical to the jury's deliberation. Our
study suggests that, because the listing of potentially corroborative evidence
appears to have such a marginal effect on the jury's verdict, the ordering of a
new trial because of an omission from the list, or an otherwise incorrect list-
ing, cannot be justified. However, it may well be that in real cases, which are
22 N. Boyd, An Empirical Look at the Effect of Corroboration Instructions in a
Rape Case (unpublished manuscript, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1976).
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longer than the simulation we conducted, the judge's instructions about corro-
boration have greater impact.
23
A second implication of the present study is that, since corroboration
instructions do not appear to affect jury deliberations in the intended manner,
they should be either revised or abolished. The purpose of the corroboration
instructions is to direct the jury to carefully scrutinize the witness' credibility
and to assess it in light of the corroborative evidence. The conclusion from
the data in this study is that this purpose is not being realized, and that some
change in corroboration instructions is needed.
23 On the other hand, a greater percentage of the time in our jury simulation was
devoted to the corroboration instructions than would be the case in an actual trial. To
determine whether judge's instructions do have greater impact in longer trials, further
experimentation on corroboration instructions employing longer stimulus trials could
be conducted.
